Metallgesellschaft Case Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Metallgesellschaft - Case Study ExampleMGRMs Supervisory Board avoided bankruptcy by liquidating its in the lead bringing positions in December 1993.MGRM had begun to experience significant growth since 1989 when it acquired 49% stake in Caste push as part of its efforts to become a fully integrated oil business in the fall in States. As MGRM continued to make a series of costly expansions, its fixed-assets values tripled between 1989 and 1991. In a continuing effort to expand its US business, MGRM entered in to forward deli truly contracts with Energy end-users at historical low prices during the summer of 1993. However, these contracts receptive MGRM to the risk of rising energy prices. To hedge this price risk, MGRM acquired energy futures at NYMEX and entered into OTC swaps with large OTC swap dealers. However, since future marketplaces do not conduct in very long term (10 years in this case), MGRMs strategy was to concentrate its derivatives positions in stacks or short- dated futures. Similarly the swaps had to be rolled forward continuously.MGRMs strategy exposed it to various risks. Its short-dated positions left it exposed to rollover risk. If the prices had risen, MGRM would give birth made satisfying profits. And the opposite was true in case of the prices falling. However historically, energy prices have always shown an upward trend. Over a period of ten years prior to 1993, the energy market had been predominantly in backwardation. MGRM was betting on Energy prices continuing to rise. However, as shown by Edwards and Canter, its rollover risk was nevertheless about 15% of its price risk. Had the market been in backwardation, MGRM would have made handsome profits. But in 1993, crude oil was in contango every month, heating oil was in contango every month omit March and April and gasoline was in contango every month except August. As a result, MGRM made substantial rollover losses during 1993.MGRM was as well as exposed to funding risk si nce its strategy was that of one-to-one hedge instead of a minimum variance hedge. This strategy would have worked had there been a one-to-one relationship between forward and spot energy prices. In that case, a fall in the spot prices would have been balanced by an equal and opposite change in the value of its forward delivery contracts. However, as shown by Edwards and Canter, a one-to-one relationship between spot and forward prices does not exist in the energy market.MGRM was to a fault exposed to credit risk due to the long duration of its forward-supply contracts. And once the prices started to fall, this risk further change magnitude as with the increased disparity in spot and contractually fixed price, the risk of the smaller firms defaulting also increased. Finally, MGRM was also exposed to basis risk due to the one-to-one hedge ratio.The timing of the investment in derivatives also went against MGRM. As stated above, 1993 proved to be disastrous year with energy market in contango for most part of the year. The huge size of MGRMs rollover trade was also responsible for increasing these risks. MGRMs huge holdings, combining weight to 160 million barrels, meant that other firms would have looked at MGRM before taking any steps. The size of MGRMs rollover trade could have also been indirectly responsible for pushing down energy prices.Hedging or Speculating in that respect is some debate over whether MGRMs strategy was hedging or speculation. Culp and